as an anti-austerity party takes power in Greece a serious confrontation looms
in Greece a serious confrontation looms
in Greece a serious confrontation looms between the new government and its
between the new government and its
between the new government and its eurozone creditors throwing into
eurozone creditors throwing into
eurozone creditors throwing into question the stability of this troubled
question the stability of this troubled
question the stability of this troubled economic union welcome to watchmojo.com
–nt we’re counting down 10 crucial
–nt we’re counting down 10 crucial facts you should know about the Greek
facts you should know about the Greek
facts you should know about the Greek debt crisis number 10
debt crisis number 10
debt crisis number 10 when did the crisis begin the United
when did the crisis begin the United
when did the crisis begin the United States entered into a recession in 2007
States entered into a recession in 2007
States entered into a recession in 2007 after the collapse of its subprime
after the collapse of its subprime
after the collapse of its subprime mortgage industry which prompted a
mortgage industry which prompted a
mortgage industry which prompted a worldwide economic downturn known as the
worldwide economic downturn known as the
worldwide economic downturn known as the Great Recession securities backed by
Great Recession securities backed by
Great Recession securities backed by these subprime mortgages had been traded
these subprime mortgages had been traded
these subprime mortgages had been traded worldwide and infected markets globally
worldwide and infected markets globally
worldwide and infected markets globally European governments were forced to bail
European governments were forced to bail
European governments were forced to bail out their banking systems which held a
out their banking systems which held a
out their banking systems which held a lot of these assets on their books these
lot of these assets on their books these
lot of these assets on their books these bailouts combined with existing high
bailouts combined with existing high
bailouts combined with existing high levels of government debt throughout
levels of government debt throughout
levels of government debt throughout Europe sparked doubt among investors as
Europe sparked doubt among investors as
Europe sparked doubt among investors as to whether European governments could
to whether European governments could
to whether European governments could successfully refinance their debt loads
successfully refinance their debt loads
successfully refinance their debt loads which ultimately led to the European
which ultimately led to the European
which ultimately led to the European sovereign debt crisis data for France
sovereign debt crisis data for France
sovereign debt crisis data for France showed the PMI they’re recording its
showed the PMI they’re recording its
showed the PMI they’re recording its biggest fall since the index began 14
biggest fall since the index began 14
biggest fall since the index began 14 years ago by 2009 it had become clear
years ago by 2009 it had become clear
years ago by 2009 it had become clear that some eurozone countries would
that some eurozone countries would
that some eurozone countries would require assistance from external
require assistance from external
require assistance from external institutions in order to manage their
institutions in order to manage their
institutions in order to manage their debt and one of these nations was Greece
debt and one of these nations was Greece
debt and one of these nations was Greece number 9 what were the underlying causes
number 9 what were the underlying causes
number 9 what were the underlying causes of the crisis since the mid 70s the
of the crisis since the mid 70s the
of the crisis since the mid 70s the Greek government had been running a
Greek government had been running a
Greek government had been running a deficit funded by issuing government
deficit funded by issuing government
deficit funded by issuing government bonds the introduction of the European
bonds the introduction of the European
bonds the introduction of the European common currency the euro in 1999 created
common currency the euro in 1999 created
common currency the euro in 1999 created a situation in which all European bonds
a situation in which all European bonds
a situation in which all European bonds were considered the same meaning Greece
were considered the same meaning Greece
were considered the same meaning Greece would pay significantly less interest on
would pay significantly less interest on
would pay significantly less interest on the bonds at issue this encouraged
the bonds at issue this encouraged
the bonds at issue this encouraged Greece to continue disastrously
Greece to continue disastrously
Greece to continue disastrously excessive deficit spending with the
excessive deficit spending with the
excessive deficit spending with the country’s government even making
country’s government even making
country’s government even making arrangements with financial institutions
arrangements with financial institutions
arrangements with financial institutions like Goldman Sachs to conceal their true
like Goldman Sachs to conceal their true
like Goldman Sachs to conceal their true level of borrowing at the same time the
level of borrowing at the same time the
level of borrowing at the same time the Greek government consistent
Greek government consistent
Greek government consistent failed to collect all of the taxes that
failed to collect all of the taxes that
failed to collect all of the taxes that were owed to them this combined with a
were owed to them this combined with a
were owed to them this combined with a large public sector kept Greek
large public sector kept Greek
large public sector kept Greek government spending high and pushed
government spending high and pushed
government spending high and pushed Greeks debt to GDP ratio to 146 percent
Greeks debt to GDP ratio to 146 percent
Greeks debt to GDP ratio to 146 percent by 2010 number eight how did the crisis
by 2010 number eight how did the crisis
by 2010 number eight how did the crisis evolve the economic crisis in Greece was
evolve the economic crisis in Greece was
evolve the economic crisis in Greece was exacerbated in April 2010 when the
exacerbated in April 2010 when the
exacerbated in April 2010 when the credit rating agency Standard & Poor
credit rating agency Standard & Poor
credit rating agency Standard & Poor downgraded Greece’s credit rating to
downgraded Greece’s credit rating to
downgraded Greece’s credit rating to junk status meaning it was not worthy of
junk status meaning it was not worthy of
junk status meaning it was not worthy of investment this effectively closed off
investment this effectively closed off
investment this effectively closed off private capital markets to Greece as a
private capital markets to Greece as a
private capital markets to Greece as a source for borrowing money international
source for borrowing money international
source for borrowing money international financial service agencies like Standard
financial service agencies like Standard
financial service agencies like Standard & Poor continuously monitor a country’s
& Poor continuously monitor a country’s
& Poor continuously monitor a country’s creditworthiness which in turn
creditworthiness which in turn
creditworthiness which in turn determines what interest rate a
determines what interest rate a
determines what interest rate a country’s bonds should yield by June
country’s bonds should yield by June
country’s bonds should yield by June 2011 Greece’s credit rating had dropped
2011 Greece’s credit rating had dropped
2011 Greece’s credit rating had dropped to triple C the lowest credit rating in
to triple C the lowest credit rating in
to triple C the lowest credit rating in the world and the country’s interest
the world and the country’s interest
the world and the country’s interest rates shot back up to pre Euro rates
rates shot back up to pre Euro rates
rates shot back up to pre Euro rates Greece earned this Triple C rating due
Greece earned this Triple C rating due
Greece earned this Triple C rating due to the belief that it might actually
to the belief that it might actually
to the belief that it might actually default on its debt obligations
default on its debt obligations
default on its debt obligations essentially meaning that the country
essentially meaning that the country
essentially meaning that the country would declare bankruptcy number seven
would declare bankruptcy number seven
would declare bankruptcy number seven what was the response to the crisis
what was the response to the crisis
what was the response to the crisis facing the prospect of default by mid
facing the prospect of default by mid
facing the prospect of default by mid 2010 Greece entered into loan agreements
2010 Greece entered into loan agreements
2010 Greece entered into loan agreements with a group of creditors consisting of
with a group of creditors consisting of
with a group of creditors consisting of other eurozone countries the
other eurozone countries the
other eurozone countries the International Monetary Fund and the
International Monetary Fund and the
International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank which was
European Central Bank which was
European Central Bank which was nicknamed the troika the first loan
nicknamed the troika the first loan
nicknamed the troika the first loan package was agreed to on May 2nd 2010 to
package was agreed to on May 2nd 2010 to
package was agreed to on May 2nd 2010 to the tune of 110 billion euros due to
the tune of 110 billion euros due to
the tune of 110 billion euros due to extreme circumstances the European Union
extreme circumstances the European Union
extreme circumstances the European Union met in July 2011 to structure a second
met in July 2011 to structure a second
met in July 2011 to structure a second loan package of 109 billion euros then
loan package of 109 billion euros then
loan package of 109 billion euros then in October 2011 eurozone leaders and the
in October 2011 eurozone leaders and the
in October 2011 eurozone leaders and the International Monetary Fund came to a
International Monetary Fund came to a
International Monetary Fund came to a joint agreement with banks in order to
joint agreement with banks in order to
joint agreement with banks in order to write off 50% of Greece’s debt over the
write off 50% of Greece’s debt over the
write off 50% of Greece’s debt over the next nine years in a plan to reduce the
next nine years in a plan to reduce the
next nine years in a plan to reduce the country’s debt to 120 percent of GDP by
country’s debt to 120 percent of GDP by
country’s debt to 120 percent of GDP by 2020 number six what were the conditions
2020 number six what were the conditions
2020 number six what were the conditions of Greece’s loan
of Greece’s loan
of Greece’s loan Greece was forced to implement severe
Greece was forced to implement severe
Greece was forced to implement severe austerity measures in return for
austerity measures in return for
austerity measures in return for receiving loans from the troika this
receiving loans from the troika this
receiving loans from the troika this included significant spending cuts
included significant spending cuts
included significant spending cuts public sector salary and pension cuts
public sector salary and pension cuts
public sector salary and pension cuts and the privatization of national
and the privatization of national
and the privatization of national industries these measures were met with
industries these measures were met with
industries these measures were met with public resistance in the form of
public resistance in the form of
public resistance in the form of widespread protests and a general
widespread protests and a general
widespread protests and a general nationwide strike
nationwide strike
nationwide strike so Madhavan party gallop student party
so Madhavan party gallop student party
so Madhavan party gallop student party debate masked protesters clashed with
debate masked protesters clashed with
debate masked protesters clashed with police on the streets of major cities
police on the streets of major cities
police on the streets of major cities hurling petrol bombs with some
hurling petrol bombs with some
hurling petrol bombs with some confrontations leading to several deaths
confrontations leading to several deaths
confrontations leading to several deaths and hundreds of injuries in 2012 the IMF
and hundreds of injuries in 2012 the IMF
and hundreds of injuries in 2012 the IMF admitted that they did not foresee the
admitted that they did not foresee the
admitted that they did not foresee the overall impact of the austerity measures
overall impact of the austerity measures
overall impact of the austerity measures which actually worsened the Greek
which actually worsened the Greek
which actually worsened the Greek recession violent riots erupted in the
recession violent riots erupted in the
recession violent riots erupted in the Greek capital of Athens throughout that
Greek capital of Athens throughout that
Greek capital of Athens throughout that year number 5 what were the consequences
year number 5 what were the consequences
year number 5 what were the consequences of austerity very sort of Lucien against
of austerity very sort of Lucien against
of austerity very sort of Lucien against the government the austerity measures
the government the austerity measures
the government the austerity measures held deep ramifications for Greece and
held deep ramifications for Greece and
held deep ramifications for Greece and severe consequences for its citizens as
severe consequences for its citizens as
severe consequences for its citizens as of February 2015
of February 2015
of February 2015 unemployment hovered around 26 percent
unemployment hovered around 26 percent
unemployment hovered around 26 percent and for those under the age of 25 that
and for those under the age of 25 that
and for those under the age of 25 that number pizzas high as 50 percent about a
number pizzas high as 50 percent about a
number pizzas high as 50 percent about a third of the population had by that
third of the population had by that
third of the population had by that point sunk below the poverty line Greece
point sunk below the poverty line Greece
point sunk below the poverty line Greece had the highest child poverty rate in
had the highest child poverty rate in
had the highest child poverty rate in Europe with nearly forty point five
Europe with nearly forty point five
Europe with nearly forty point five percent of children trapped in
percent of children trapped in
percent of children trapped in impoverished circumstances furthermore a
impoverished circumstances furthermore a
impoverished circumstances furthermore a study found that after every new round
study found that after every new round
study found that after every new round of austerity measures wasn’t forced
of austerity measures wasn’t forced
of austerity measures wasn’t forced suicide rates in men and women increased
suicide rates in men and women increased
suicide rates in men and women increased by 12% to 36% and remained high the
by 12% to 36% and remained high the
by 12% to 36% and remained high the conditions that the troika requested in
conditions that the troika requested in
conditions that the troika requested in return for bailing out the Greek economy
return for bailing out the Greek economy
return for bailing out the Greek economy were so harsh that it prompted one
were so harsh that it prompted one
were so harsh that it prompted one United Nations official to speculate
United Nations official to speculate
United Nations official to speculate that they constituted human rights
that they constituted human rights
that they constituted human rights violations number four
violations number four
violations number four how has the crisis affected Europe
how has the crisis affected Europe
how has the crisis affected Europe Greece was set to receive a final batch
Greece was set to receive a final batch
Greece was set to receive a final batch of funding On February 28 2015 however
of funding On February 28 2015 however
of funding On February 28 2015 however Greece’s recently elected left-wing
Greece’s recently elected left-wing
Greece’s recently elected left-wing government had proclaimed its desire to
government had proclaimed its desire to
government had proclaimed its desire to halt austerity and renegotiate the terms
halt austerity and renegotiate the terms
halt austerity and renegotiate the terms of its debt even suggesting that a
of its debt even suggesting that a
of its debt even suggesting that a round of debt Forgiveness would be
round of debt Forgiveness would be
round of debt Forgiveness would be necessary German Chancellor Angela
necessary German Chancellor Angela
necessary German Chancellor Angela Merkel signaled that more loans would
Merkel signaled that more loans would
Merkel signaled that more loans would not be extended to Greece nor would any
not be extended to Greece nor would any
not be extended to Greece nor would any more of its debt be forgiven by that
more of its debt be forgiven by that
more of its debt be forgiven by that point it was likely that if an agreement
point it was likely that if an agreement
point it was likely that if an agreement were not reached Greece would default on
were not reached Greece would default on
were not reached Greece would default on its debt and exit the eurozone that
its debt and exit the eurozone that
its debt and exit the eurozone that theoretical event would likely cause a
theoretical event would likely cause a
theoretical event would likely cause a ripple effect that would see other
ripple effect that would see other
ripple effect that would see other indebted countries choosing to leave
indebted countries choosing to leave
indebted countries choosing to leave their debts and the euro zone behind
their debts and the euro zone behind
their debts and the euro zone behind causing the complete breakdown of the
causing the complete breakdown of the
causing the complete breakdown of the eurozone with dire economic consequences
eurozone with dire economic consequences
eurozone with dire economic consequences for every European country number 3 who
for every European country number 3 who
for every European country number 3 who is in charge now the problem is not just
is in charge now the problem is not just
is in charge now the problem is not just clearly just just great its European
clearly just just great its European
clearly just just great its European problem Greece is a part of the eurozone
problem Greece is a part of the eurozone
problem Greece is a part of the eurozone and the problem of debt of Greece is a
and the problem of debt of Greece is a
and the problem of debt of Greece is a part of over of a bigger european
part of over of a bigger european
part of over of a bigger european problem on january 25th 2014 alexis
problem on january 25th 2014 alexis
problem on january 25th 2014 alexis tsipras the leader of Greece’s leftist
tsipras the leader of Greece’s leftist
tsipras the leader of Greece’s leftist political party the coalition of the
political party the coalition of the
political party the coalition of the radical left or syriza as it’s commonly
radical left or syriza as it’s commonly
radical left or syriza as it’s commonly known became the new prime minister of
known became the new prime minister of
known became the new prime minister of greece cyprus was part of the Greek
greece cyprus was part of the Greek
greece cyprus was part of the Greek Communist Youth Organization in the
Communist Youth Organization in the
Communist Youth Organization in the 1980s and in the 90s rose to political
1980s and in the 90s rose to political
1980s and in the 90s rose to political prominence as a leader of the student
prominence as a leader of the student
prominence as a leader of the student movement
movement
movement soon after the new government was formed
soon after the new government was formed
soon after the new government was formed discussions began between Greece’s new
discussions began between Greece’s new
discussions began between Greece’s new finance minister Yanis varoufakis and
finance minister Yanis varoufakis and
finance minister Yanis varoufakis and Europe’s financial officials bata
Europe’s financial officials bata
Europe’s financial officials bata focused toward Europe drumming up
focused toward Europe drumming up
focused toward Europe drumming up support for Cerises
support for Cerises
support for Cerises anti austerity and debt negotiation
anti austerity and debt negotiation
anti austerity and debt negotiation platform upon which they had campaigned
platform upon which they had campaigned
platform upon which they had campaigned and won the support of the Greek
and won the support of the Greek
and won the support of the Greek electorate vada Farkas managed to gain a
electorate vada Farkas managed to gain a
electorate vada Farkas managed to gain a sympathetic ear from many in Europe most
sympathetic ear from many in Europe most
sympathetic ear from many in Europe most notably the French but the Germans
notably the French but the Germans
notably the French but the Germans remained steadfast in their refusal to
remained steadfast in their refusal to
remained steadfast in their refusal to entertain his proposals number two what
entertain his proposals number two what
entertain his proposals number two what is the new government’s vision the new
is the new government’s vision the new
is the new government’s vision the new Greek finance minister devised a plan to
Greek finance minister devised a plan to
Greek finance minister devised a plan to end the country’s austerity measures
end the country’s austerity measures
end the country’s austerity measures while also cutting Greece’s debt Greece
while also cutting Greece’s debt Greece
while also cutting Greece’s debt Greece would swap the outstanding debt for new
would swap the outstanding debt for new
would swap the outstanding debt for new growth linked bonds this new plan came
growth linked bonds this new plan came
growth linked bonds this new plan came in the wake of his previously stated
in the wake of his previously stated
in the wake of his previously stated goal which was to spearhead a write-off
goal which was to spearhead a write-off
goal which was to spearhead a write-off of Greece’s foreign debt this previous
of Greece’s foreign debt this previous
of Greece’s foreign debt this previous plan was unacceptable to Germany and
plan was unacceptable to Germany and
plan was unacceptable to Germany and other creditor countries due to the fact
other creditor countries due to the fact
other creditor countries due to the fact that it implied a loss to taxpayers in
that it implied a loss to taxpayers in
that it implied a loss to taxpayers in their countries but who focuses
their countries but who focuses
their countries but who focuses overarching message
overarching message
overarching message was that the original loans extended to
was that the original loans extended to
was that the original loans extended to Greece were completely irrational to
Greece were completely irrational to
Greece were completely irrational to begin with his argument was that in 2010
begin with his argument was that in 2010
begin with his argument was that in 2010 Greece effectively became insolvent and
Greece effectively became insolvent and
Greece effectively became insolvent and the euro zone’s response was to extend
the euro zone’s response was to extend
the euro zone’s response was to extend and pretend meaning they extended more
and pretend meaning they extended more
and pretend meaning they extended more loans to the country while pretending
loans to the country while pretending
loans to the country while pretending that there was a realistic possibility
that there was a realistic possibility
that there was a realistic possibility that they could be repaid number one how
that they could be repaid number one how
that they could be repaid number one how will the Greek people move forward but a
will the Greek people move forward but a
will the Greek people move forward but a focus a former economics professor at
focus a former economics professor at
focus a former economics professor at the University of Athens chose to play
the University of Athens chose to play
the University of Athens chose to play hardball with the European Union making
hardball with the European Union making
hardball with the European Union making drastic proposals that he knew would
drastic proposals that he knew would
drastic proposals that he knew would attract a lot of media attention his
attract a lot of media attention his
attract a lot of media attention his strategy was considered risky and it
strategy was considered risky and it
strategy was considered risky and it remains unclear if it will be effective
remains unclear if it will be effective
remains unclear if it will be effective the Greek government will not negotiate
the Greek government will not negotiate
the Greek government will not negotiate with the troika only with official
with the troika only with official
with the troika only with official partners there was widespread
partners there was widespread
partners there was widespread recognition among economists that there
recognition among economists that there
recognition among economists that there was no real possibility of Greece ever
was no real possibility of Greece ever
was no real possibility of Greece ever repaying its entire debt in order to
repaying its entire debt in order to
repaying its entire debt in order to keep the eurozone intact the European
keep the eurozone intact the European
keep the eurozone intact the European Union will likely reach a compromise
Union will likely reach a compromise
Union will likely reach a compromise that would involve extending the
that would involve extending the
that would involve extending the February deadline while also extending
February deadline while also extending
February deadline while also extending the period when Greece’s debt repayments
the period when Greece’s debt repayments
the period when Greece’s debt repayments would be due and offering a lower or
would be due and offering a lower or
would be due and offering a lower or even 0% interest rate cereza for their
even 0% interest rate cereza for their
even 0% interest rate cereza for their part will likely try to stay true to
part will likely try to stay true to
part will likely try to stay true to their vision of social justice providing
their vision of social justice providing
their vision of social justice providing aid to those Greeks hit hardest by
aid to those Greeks hit hardest by
aid to those Greeks hit hardest by austerity measures did these facts
austerity measures did these facts
austerity measures did these facts surprise you to vote for which news
surprise you to vote for which news
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