Wired to Cooperate | Paulina Dzianach | TEDxUniversityOfAberdeen

the balance between good and evil has

the balance between good and evil has been over thousands of years topic of

been over thousands of years topic of

been over thousands of years topic of inspiration for philosophers great

inspiration for philosophers great

inspiration for philosophers great thinkers poets etc we tend to scowl on

thinkers poets etc we tend to scowl on

thinkers poets etc we tend to scowl on the exploiters of the world and praise

the exploiters of the world and praise

the exploiters of the world and praise the co-operators we may do so because

the co-operators we may do so because

the co-operators we may do so because people could perform cooperative actions

people could perform cooperative actions

people could perform cooperative actions benefit the society and so they may

benefit the society and so they may

benefit the society and so they may potentially benefit us no way our

potentially benefit us no way our

potentially benefit us no way our admiration may also come from our

admiration may also come from our

admiration may also come from our upbringing we can be to some extent

upbringing we can be to some extent

upbringing we can be to some extent taught by the society to admire

taught by the society to admire

taught by the society to admire co-operators as during are bringing we

co-operators as during are bringing we

co-operators as during are bringing we are presented with models of exemplary

are presented with models of exemplary

are presented with models of exemplary behaviors which we are encouraged to

behaviors which we are encouraged to

behaviors which we are encouraged to follow in some cases cooperation will

follow in some cases cooperation will

follow in some cases cooperation will also be deemed to show superior strength

also be deemed to show superior strength

also be deemed to show superior strength of live individual who by helping others

of live individual who by helping others

of live individual who by helping others shows that he is capable of sparing some

shows that he is capable of sparing some

shows that he is capable of sparing some of his resources not all people agree in

of his resources not all people agree in

of his resources not all people agree in the admiration of co-operators there is

the admiration of co-operators there is

the admiration of co-operators there is a famous quote by one of Polish writers

a famous quote by one of Polish writers

a famous quote by one of Polish writers heroes of abramoff Tremaine Caserta

heroes of abramoff Tremaine Caserta

heroes of abramoff Tremaine Caserta mich Mich tardo dupa illiteracy a

mich Mich tardo dupa illiteracy a

mich Mich tardo dupa illiteracy a revenue loss Tania now allowed myself to

revenue loss Tania now allowed myself to

revenue loss Tania now allowed myself to roughly translate the statement and this

roughly translate the statement and this

roughly translate the statement and this is what I came up with one who has a

is what I came up with one who has a

is what I came up with one who has a soft heart must have a hard bottom that

soft heart must have a hard bottom that

soft heart must have a hard bottom that he is prepared to get kicked in it now

he is prepared to get kicked in it now

he is prepared to get kicked in it now heard a statement so many times my life

heard a statement so many times my life

heard a statement so many times my life coconut such conviction even by eminent

coconut such conviction even by eminent

coconut such conviction even by eminent political figures I mind you it seems

political figures I mind you it seems

political figures I mind you it seems that is accepted by many people to be a

that is accepted by many people to be a

that is accepted by many people to be a universal truth although I am by no

universal truth although I am by no

universal truth although I am by no means accepting the statement with full

means accepting the statement with full

means accepting the statement with full conviction I am forced to give it some

conviction I am forced to give it some

conviction I am forced to give it some credit certainly a person or individual

credit certainly a person or individual

credit certainly a person or individual who spent this effort to contribute to

who spent this effort to contribute to

who spent this effort to contribute to society

society

society or to a group is to some extent variable

or to a group is to some extent variable

or to a group is to some extent variable to being exploited but the people within

to being exploited but the people within

to being exploited but the people within the group

the group

the group however I’ll never believe does having

however I’ll never believe does having

however I’ll never believe does having soft heart is the weakness to the

soft heart is the weakness to the

soft heart is the weakness to the contrary I believe that cooperation and

contrary I believe that cooperation and

contrary I believe that cooperation and caring caring about other people’s

caring caring about other people’s

caring caring about other people’s wealth welfare sorry can actually be a

wealth welfare sorry can actually be a

wealth welfare sorry can actually be a strength even in terms of survival but I

strength even in terms of survival but I

strength even in terms of survival but I don’t want you to take my word for it I

don’t want you to take my word for it I

don’t want you to take my word for it I want to show it to you with game theory

want to show it to you with game theory

want to show it to you with game theory so I don’t know if you’ve heard about

so I don’t know if you’ve heard about

so I don’t know if you’ve heard about game theory it is a field of study which

game theory it is a field of study which

game theory it is a field of study which analyzes success of various strategies

analyzes success of various strategies

analyzes success of various strategies which can be employed in a given

which can be employed in a given

which can be employed in a given interaction between living organisms the

interaction between living organisms the

interaction between living organisms the most famous example in game theory is

most famous example in game theory is

most famous example in game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma in the prisoner’s

the prisoner’s dilemma in the prisoner’s

the prisoner’s dilemma in the prisoner’s dilemma two prisoners committed for the

dilemma two prisoners committed for the

dilemma two prisoners committed for the same crime are interrogated separately

same crime are interrogated separately

same crime are interrogated separately by the police during the interrogation

by the police during the interrogation

by the police during the interrogation each prisoner faces a choice to either

each prisoner faces a choice to either

each prisoner faces a choice to either confess their crime or to stay silent

confess their crime or to stay silent

confess their crime or to stay silent the offer given to each prisoner by the

the offer given to each prisoner by the

the offer given to each prisoner by the police is such that no matter what the

police is such that no matter what the

police is such that no matter what the other player does it is always

other player does it is always

other player does it is always advantageous for each prisoner to

advantageous for each prisoner to

advantageous for each prisoner to confess to the police and thus betray

confess to the police and thus betray

confess to the police and thus betray their partner in crime to lower their

their partner in crime to lower their

their partner in crime to lower their own sentence interestingly if both

own sentence interestingly if both

own sentence interestingly if both players chose to cooperate with each

players chose to cooperate with each

players chose to cooperate with each other and they both remain silent do you

other and they both remain silent do you

other and they both remain silent do you would both be better off as the police

would both be better off as the police

would both be better off as the police wouldn’t have enough evidence to convict

wouldn’t have enough evidence to convict

wouldn’t have enough evidence to convict either of them for all of their crimes

either of them for all of their crimes

either of them for all of their crimes so the personal dilemma can be

so the personal dilemma can be

so the personal dilemma can be translated to countless examples of

translated to countless examples of

translated to countless examples of instances where a player faces a choice

instances where a player faces a choice

instances where a player faces a choice to either cooperate with the other

to either cooperate with the other

to either cooperate with the other player or to exploit him the

player or to exploit him the

player or to exploit him the interactions between the two strategies

interactions between the two strategies

interactions between the two strategies can be generalized as follows whenever a

can be generalized as follows whenever a

can be generalized as follows whenever a cooperator meet another cooperator they

cooperator meet another cooperator they

cooperator meet another cooperator they both benefit from mutual cooperation and

both benefit from mutual cooperation and

both benefit from mutual cooperation and so they both receive some reward this

so they both receive some reward this

so they both receive some reward this can be visualized in terms of I helped

can be visualized in terms of I helped

can be visualized in terms of I helped you and you helped me or I scratch your

you and you helped me or I scratch your

you and you helped me or I scratch your back and you scratch mine in the case

back and you scratch mine in the case

back and you scratch mine in the case when a cooperator is an exploiter the

when a cooperator is an exploiter the

when a cooperator is an exploiter the cooperator is exploited and suffers the

cooperator is exploited and suffers the

cooperator is exploited and suffers the loss

loss

loss well the exploiter walks off with reward

well the exploiter walks off with reward

well the exploiter walks off with reward which is higher than the reward

which is higher than the reward

which is higher than the reward resulting from mutual cooperation an

resulting from mutual cooperation an

resulting from mutual cooperation an example of exploiter here would be a

example of exploiter here would be a

example of exploiter here would be a seagull who steals the donut away from a

seagull who steals the donut away from a

seagull who steals the donut away from a hungry gentleman who actually paid for

hungry gentleman who actually paid for

hungry gentleman who actually paid for the donut but will never benefit from

the donut but will never benefit from

the donut but will never benefit from eating it so if our seagull was a

eating it so if our seagull was a

eating it so if our seagull was a cooperator then it would pay its share

cooperator then it would pay its share

cooperator then it would pay its share and the cost of the donut and a seagull

and the cost of the donut and a seagull

and the cost of the donut and a seagull and the gentleman was those with the

and the gentleman was those with the

and the gentleman was those with the donut between them equally would both be

donut between them equally would both be

donut between them equally would both be happy over it benefits the seagull to be

happy over it benefits the seagull to be

happy over it benefits the seagull to be sneaky and steal the whole donut and fly

sneaky and steal the whole donut and fly

sneaky and steal the whole donut and fly away

away

away now obviously the seagull can’t help it

now obviously the seagull can’t help it

now obviously the seagull can’t help it behavior but if we change the word

behavior but if we change the word

behavior but if we change the word seagull for the word thief turn the

seagull for the word thief turn the

seagull for the word thief turn the whole point stands now the last case

whole point stands now the last case

whole point stands now the last case when an exploiter meets an exploiter the

when an exploiter meets an exploiter the

when an exploiter meets an exploiter the interaction between them can be summed

interaction between them can be summed

interaction between them can be summed up as spiteful so neither of them is

up as spiteful so neither of them is

up as spiteful so neither of them is benefiting from the interaction and may

benefiting from the interaction and may

benefiting from the interaction and may in fact suffer a loss so in our battle

in fact suffer a loss so in our battle

in fact suffer a loss so in our battle between good and evil when we place a

between good and evil when we place a

between good and evil when we place a cooperator against an exploiter who’s

cooperator against an exploiter who’s

cooperator against an exploiter who’s going to win what’s going to be the

going to win what’s going to be the

going to win what’s going to be the exploiter race oh it is true that in the

exploiter race oh it is true that in the

exploiter race oh it is true that in the case of isolated reaction interaction

case of isolated reaction interaction

case of isolated reaction interaction between two types of players the

between two types of players the

between two types of players the cooperator one cooperator doesn’t stand

cooperator one cooperator doesn’t stand

cooperator one cooperator doesn’t stand a chance against an exporter but that

a chance against an exporter but that

a chance against an exporter but that this mean that cooperation is naive that

this mean that cooperation is naive that

this mean that cooperation is naive that it is the weaker strategy inferior to

it is the weaker strategy inferior to

it is the weaker strategy inferior to exploiting other player oh yeah in the

exploiting other player oh yeah in the

exploiting other player oh yeah in the case of isolates interactions when we

case of isolates interactions when we

case of isolates interactions when we have only two players

have only two players

have only two players Nonya i suppose it is the weaker

Nonya i suppose it is the weaker

Nonya i suppose it is the weaker strategy but luckily in our population

strategy but luckily in our population

strategy but luckily in our population the interactions are usually not limited

the interactions are usually not limited

the interactions are usually not limited to two individuals at a time more

to two individuals at a time more

to two individuals at a time more commonly the interactions are a spacial

commonly the interactions are a spacial

commonly the interactions are a spacial and so many people interact

and so many people interact

and so many people interact simultaneously with a number of other

simultaneously with a number of other

simultaneously with a number of other individuals so in my research I studied

individuals so in my research I studied

individuals so in my research I studied the model first created by Martin Novick

the model first created by Martin Novick

the model first created by Martin Novick and Robert Murray and nine

and Robert Murray and nine

and Robert Murray and nine – so their model is a two-dimensional

– so their model is a two-dimensional

– so their model is a two-dimensional variant of the prisoner’s dilemma so in

variant of the prisoner’s dilemma so in

variant of the prisoner’s dilemma so in this model what they did was put the

this model what they did was put the

this model what they did was put the exploiters and co-operators

exploiters and co-operators

exploiters and co-operators on a two-dimensional space and they let

on a two-dimensional space and they let

on a two-dimensional space and they let all the players interact with one

all the players interact with one

all the players interact with one another according to the same

another according to the same

another according to the same interactions as in the prisoner’s

interactions as in the prisoner’s

interactions as in the prisoner’s dilemma so the only difference here was

dilemma so the only difference here was

dilemma so the only difference here was that instead of interacting with only

that instead of interacting with only

that instead of interacting with only one player at a time each player was

one player at a time each player was

one player at a time each player was allowed to interact with eight other

allowed to interact with eight other

allowed to interact with eight other players in their neighborhood one step

players in their neighborhood one step

players in their neighborhood one step so the success of each player was

so the success of each player was

so the success of each player was determined by the total reward that he

determined by the total reward that he

determined by the total reward that he was able to get from all of his

was able to get from all of his

was able to get from all of his neighbors and if he scored less than any

neighbors and if he scored less than any

neighbors and if he scored less than any of his neighbors then she would have to

of his neighbors then she would have to

of his neighbors then she would have to give up his space in the game he became

give up his space in the game he became

give up his space in the game he became eliminated and the successful neighbor

eliminated and the successful neighbor

eliminated and the successful neighbor would take over his face in the game so

would take over his face in the game so

would take over his face in the game so when I implemented the model and let it

when I implemented the model and let it

when I implemented the model and let it run this is what I get for one set of

run this is what I get for one set of

run this is what I get for one set of parameters so we see that after the

parameters so we see that after the

parameters so we see that after the simulation goes on here the co-operators

simulation goes on here the co-operators

simulation goes on here the co-operators are represented by the color blue and

are represented by the color blue and

are represented by the color blue and exploiters are red so we see that

exploiters are red so we see that

exploiters are red so we see that actually co-operators survived and

actually co-operators survived and

actually co-operators survived and actually as completes the exploiters so

actually as completes the exploiters so

actually as completes the exploiters so we see that the tables have turned by

we see that the tables have turned by

we see that the tables have turned by removing the aggression of the

removing the aggression of the

removing the aggression of the interactions we actually give an

interactions we actually give an

interactions we actually give an opportunity for co-operators to gain

opportunity for co-operators to gain

opportunity for co-operators to gain some reward from others of their type

some reward from others of their type

some reward from others of their type and thus win against exploiters so this

and thus win against exploiters so this

and thus win against exploiters so this is a nice result that’s what we want

is a nice result that’s what we want

is a nice result that’s what we want when we increase their word for

when we increase their word for

when we increase their word for exploiters also but I know it’s a little

exploiters also but I know it’s a little

exploiters also but I know it’s a little kaleidoscope dance between the

kaleidoscope dance between the

kaleidoscope dance between the co-operators and exploiters so here we

co-operators and exploiters so here we

co-operators and exploiters so here we see that although both strategies are

see that although both strategies are

see that although both strategies are somewhat successful by increasing the

somewhat successful by increasing the

somewhat successful by increasing the reward for exploiters we possibly

reward for exploiters we possibly

reward for exploiters we possibly decrease the number of co-operators in

decrease the number of co-operators in

decrease the number of co-operators in our system so if we keep keep increasing

our system so if we keep keep increasing

our system so if we keep keep increasing the number ward for our exploiters then

the number ward for our exploiters then

the number ward for our exploiters then we finally reach a point where we

we finally reach a point where we

we finally reach a point where we see a total extinction of co-operators

see a total extinction of co-operators

see a total extinction of co-operators in our system so yes it is possible in

in our system so yes it is possible in

in our system so yes it is possible in the face of very aggressive exploiters

the face of very aggressive exploiters

the face of very aggressive exploiters to wipe out all co-operators

to wipe out all co-operators

to wipe out all co-operators interestingly the opposite is not true

interestingly the opposite is not true

interestingly the opposite is not true so it is not possible for co-operators

so it is not possible for co-operators

so it is not possible for co-operators to exterminate an exploiter in the case

to exterminate an exploiter in the case

to exterminate an exploiter in the case of one exploiters surrounded by

of one exploiters surrounded by

of one exploiters surrounded by co-operators both the exploiter and the

co-operators both the exploiter and the

co-operators both the exploiter and the co-operators have an equal number of

co-operators have an equal number of

co-operators have an equal number of co-operators random so that since the

co-operators random so that since the

co-operators random so that since the exploiters reward from meeting a

exploiters reward from meeting a

exploiters reward from meeting a cooperator is always higher than the

cooperator is always higher than the

cooperator is always higher than the world the co-operators gains from each

world the co-operators gains from each

world the co-operators gains from each other his reward is always going to be

other his reward is always going to be

other his reward is always going to be higher than the world of his neighbors

higher than the world of his neighbors

higher than the world of his neighbors and so that he will happily be able to

and so that he will happily be able to

and so that he will happily be able to hold this place surrounded by

hold this place surrounded by

hold this place surrounded by co-operators and live of the

co-operators and live of the

co-operators and live of the co-operators resources indefinitely

co-operators resources indefinitely

co-operators resources indefinitely so now I’ve shown you how the strategy

so now I’ve shown you how the strategy

so now I’ve shown you how the strategy to cooperate prevails in the face of

to cooperate prevails in the face of

to cooperate prevails in the face of invasion by selfish players for a wide

invasion by selfish players for a wide

invasion by selfish players for a wide range of scenarios now obviously this

range of scenarios now obviously this

range of scenarios now obviously this model assumes that the players are wired

model assumes that the players are wired

model assumes that the players are wired or programmed to play one or the other

or programmed to play one or the other

or programmed to play one or the other strategy and we have to admit that

strategy and we have to admit that

strategy and we have to admit that humans are much more complex than that

humans are much more complex than that

humans are much more complex than that we are able to adjust their strategies

we are able to adjust their strategies

we are able to adjust their strategies according to some decision-making

according to some decision-making

according to some decision-making process

process

process so each time we make a decision to

so each time we make a decision to

so each time we make a decision to either contribute or to take something

either contribute or to take something

either contribute or to take something from a society in that moment we

from a society in that moment we

from a society in that moment we identify ourselves with one or the other

identify ourselves with one or the other

identify ourselves with one or the other strategy the humans power of reasoning

strategy the humans power of reasoning

strategy the humans power of reasoning has visibly led to an increase in

has visibly led to an increase in

has visibly led to an increase in cooperation our population so by

cooperation our population so by

cooperation our population so by introducing government-paid jobs like

introducing government-paid jobs like

introducing government-paid jobs like social care teaching or firefighting we

social care teaching or firefighting we

social care teaching or firefighting we promote cooperation in our population

promote cooperation in our population

promote cooperation in our population another form of promoting cooperation is

another form of promoting cooperation is

another form of promoting cooperation is introducing punishment for cheating so

introducing punishment for cheating so

introducing punishment for cheating so we can send to prison or you can find

we can send to prison or you can find

we can send to prison or you can find people for breaking the law these

people for breaking the law these

people for breaking the law these practices are essentially designed to

practices are essentially designed to

practices are essentially designed to explode

explode

explode a selfish player from society the part

a selfish player from society the part

a selfish player from society the part of the law to promote cooperation is

of the law to promote cooperation is

of the law to promote cooperation is limited so that some unethical practices

limited so that some unethical practices

limited so that some unethical practices are not punishable by law or the

are not punishable by law or the

are not punishable by law or the punishment is much smaller than the

punishment is much smaller than the

punishment is much smaller than the potential reward and that way a certain

potential reward and that way a certain

potential reward and that way a certain balance is maintained between

balance is maintained between

balance is maintained between cooperation and exploitation in our

cooperation and exploitation in our

cooperation and exploitation in our society the model I’ve shown you

society the model I’ve shown you

society the model I’ve shown you supports the idea that both selfish and

supports the idea that both selfish and

supports the idea that both selfish and selfless interactions must coexist and

selfless interactions must coexist and

selfless interactions must coexist and yes in the real world so in that way

yes in the real world so in that way

yes in the real world so in that way kind of the battle between the good and

kind of the battle between the good and

kind of the battle between the good and evil side of our characters is never

evil side of our characters is never

evil side of our characters is never ending with neither side able to win

ending with neither side able to win

ending with neither side able to win over the other to conclude this model

over the other to conclude this model

over the other to conclude this model can be also used to argue that

can be also used to argue that

can be also used to argue that cooperation and selfless actions are not

cooperation and selfless actions are not

cooperation and selfless actions are not naive not only do these actions benefits

naive not only do these actions benefits

naive not only do these actions benefits whole population across species but also

whole population across species but also

whole population across species but also they can be they can be successful

they can be they can be successful

they can be they can be successful behavior strategies and each

behavior strategies and each

behavior strategies and each individual’s quest to prosper this is

individual’s quest to prosper this is

individual’s quest to prosper this is all due to the fact that cooperation by

all due to the fact that cooperation by

all due to the fact that cooperation by strengthening the whole group makes the

strengthening the whole group makes the

strengthening the whole group makes the whole groups sorry the whole group makes

whole groups sorry the whole group makes

whole groups sorry the whole group makes it more resistant to invasion by selfish

it more resistant to invasion by selfish

it more resistant to invasion by selfish players and so may actually become a

players and so may actually become a

players and so may actually become a successful survival strategy I believe

successful survival strategy I believe

successful survival strategy I believe in the light of these results the quote

in the light of these results the quote

in the light of these results the quote by years of our growth may be modified

by years of our growth may be modified

by years of our growth may be modified to one who has a soft heart must run

to one who has a soft heart must run

to one who has a soft heart must run himself with others alike so he can

himself with others alike so he can

himself with others alike so he can fight their adversaries together thank

fight their adversaries together thank

fight their adversaries together thank you

you

you [Applause]